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WALLING OUT:
RULES AND STANDARDS IN THE
BEACH ACCESS CONTEXT
TIMOTHY M. MULVANEY*
The overwhelming majority of U.S. states facially allocate exclusionary
rights and access privileges to beaches by categorically deciding whom to
wall in and whom to wall out. In the conventional terms of the longstanding
debate surrounding the design of legal directives, such “rules” are
considered substantively determinant ex ante and, in application,
analogically transparent across similarly situated cases. Only a small
number of jurisdictions have adopted “standards” in the beach access
context, which—again, on the conventional account—sacrifice both
determinacy and transparency for the ability to accommodate ex post the
complexities of individual cases. This Article contends that beach access
policy illustrates the familiar limitations of this conventional rules-versusstandards account in two elucidating ways. First, the implementation of
contemporary beach access law suggests that the gap between rules and
standards with respect to the virtue of determinacy is not nearly as wide as
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the conventional account allows. In short, beach access rules are not and
cannot in actuality be divorced from context, while beach access standards
take shape through applications that reveal core archetypes. Second, while
beach access rules reflect the virtue of transparency in the sense that they
minimize some forms of arbitrariness, standards offer their own, robust
version of transparency, which is grounded in promoting dialogue and
demanding accountability. The Article offers these contentions not to press
the view that standards are necessarily superior to rules en masse, but,
instead, to prompt reflection on the nearly uniform and seemingly impulsive
rule fetishism that has held sway in the beach access context.
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INTRODUCTION
Proponents of erecting walls—both real and figurative—to address
myriad issues, from immigration to pollution to trade, often turn to the
proverb “good fences make good neighbors” brought to prominence in
Robert Frost’s 1962 poem, Mending Wall.1 Frost’s work, though, is no more
1. See, e.g., Charles Selle, ‘Walling in or Walling out’ Is Folly We Can’t Afford, CHI. TRIB. (Jan.
23, 2019, 10:40 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/lake-county-news-sun/opinion/ct-lnsselle-trump-wall-st-0124-story.html [perma.cc/CB2L-WQ9L].
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a polemic plea for building walls than an impassioned appeal against them.
The narrator in the poem, engaged in conversation with a fellow farmer, is
instead in search of reasons for and against the annual ritual of rebuilding
the loose-stone barriers that characterized much of the early twentieth
century New England landscape. “Before I built a wall,” suggests the
narrator, “I’d ask to know [w]hat I was walling in or walling out, [a]nd to
whom I was like to give offense.”2
Today, the overwhelming majority of U.S. states facially allocate
exclusionary rights and access privileges to privately-titled dry sand beaches
by categorically deciding whom to wall in and whom to wall out.3 In a great
many jurisdictions, waterfront titleholders seemingly can exclude from the
beach all comers in all instances without cause; in select others, they are
categorically precluded from constraining third-party access to the beach
regardless of the circumstances. In the conventional terms of the debate
surrounding the design of legal directives, such “rules” are considered
substantively determinant ex ante and, in application, analogically
transparent across similarly situated cases. Only a small number of
jurisdictions have adopted beach access “standards,” which, consistent with
the Mending Wall narrator’s counsel, more flexibly engage in reasoning ex
post that is sensitive to the complexities of individual cases. Standards do so,
though, only—again, in accord with conventional terms—at the sacrifice of
determinacy and transparency.
This Article contends that beach access policy illustrates the familiar
limitations of the conventional rules-versus-standards account in two
elucidating ways. First, the implementation of contemporary beach access
law suggests that the gap between rules and standards with respect to the
virtue of determinacy is not nearly as wide as the conventional account
allows. Second, while rules reflect the virtue of transparency in the sense that
they minimize some forms of arbitrariness, standards offer their own, robust
version of transparency.
Part I elicits the first claim through a historically sensitive charting of
three overarching approaches to beach access: robust exclusionary rights,
2. Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST: THE COLLECTED POEMS,
COMPLETE AND UNABRIDGED 33–34 (Edward Connery Latham ed., 1969).
3. Lands flowed by the tide are owned by the state and impressed with a public trust for the benefit
of all. See generally COASTAL STATES ORG., INC., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK (2d
ed. 1997). Public ownership in tidal waterways extends up to the mean high-tide line in most states,
though select states limit public ownership to the area seaward of the low-tide line. See James M. Kehoe,
The Next Wave in Public Beach Access: Removal of States as Trustees of Public Trust Properties, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1916 (1995). This Article concentrates on access to and use of beaches landward
of those operative lines demarcating strict public ownership.
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unfettered access privileges, and a reasonable access norm. It suggests that
interpreting what on their face are the rigid, acontextual rules of robust
exclusionary rights and unfettered access privileges, respectively, cannot in
actuality be divorced from context. When new contexts arise, these rules do
not automatically determine the scope of their own application; instead,
beachgoers and titleholders reflect on whether the policies underpinning
those rules apply in a new context and, where necessary, call on judges to
perform their role of exercising judgment in determining whether to craft an
exception to the rule, fashion a qualification to it, or recognize a distinction
by reference to norms and policies that negates its application wholesale. In
this regard, this Part suggests that these beach access “rules” are not wholly
distinct from what, on their face, are those more open-ended “standards”
protecting reasonable access that take shape through applications that reveal
core archetypes.
Part II, in advancing the second claim, concedes that rule-like
approaches have been appropriately lauded for their transparency in that they
require decisionmakers to treat like cases alike and thereby minimize some
forms of arbitrariness or bias. However, the Part submits that standard-based
approaches offer their own version of transparency—one grounded in
promoting dialogue, demanding accountability, and insisting on
justification—that is also of great import. On this latter version, rules might
be characterized by a lack of transparency if controversies are allegedly
decided by application or nonapplication of a rule based on a blanket
assertion of what that rule entails while the actual reasons for deciding
whether a hard case is within or outside the rule go unexpressed.
Highlighting the determinacy and transparency features of standards is
not offered here to press the ultimate claim that, in all circumstances,
standards necessarily are superior to rules, standards necessarily reveal value
judgments, or rules necessarily suppress or conceal those judgments. Rather,
the Article concludes more modestly with the hope that developing an
understanding of these features will prompt reflection on the near uniformity
and seeming impulsivity of the rule fetishism that has held sway in the beach
access context to date.
I. RULES AND STANDARDS: DETERMINACY
Even where codified through legislation or administrative regulations
on coastal permitting, policies regarding access to and use of dry sand
beaches in most U.S. states largely have their roots in interpretations of the
common law doctrines of implied dedication, prescription, custom, and the
public trust. Beach access in a vast majority of states construes each of these
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common law doctrines in narrow terms by recognizing robust exclusionary
rights in those who hold title to dry sand beaches. Select outliers offer
broader readings of these common law doctrines, and thereby afford
unfettered access privileges or reasonable access. Though laws respecting
unfettered access privileges are similar to reasonable access approaches in
their relatively expansive view of the public’s interest in accessing beaches,
they mirror the law in those jurisdictions respecting robust exclusionary
rights in terms of their lack of patent attention to context.
Drawing on the historical development of beach access policy in three
states—Texas, Oregon, and New Jersey—as illustrative of the three alternate
approaches outlined above, this Part proceeds in three Sections. The first
Section explains that, in the conventional terms of the long-running rulesversus-standards debate, Texas’s and Oregon’s approaches reflect “rules”
that are determinate ex ante but have the propensity to be over- and underinclusive given the irreducible complexity and evolving nature of our moral
perspectives and policy goals.4 It then critiques this view on the grounds that
beach access rules cannot in actuality be divorced from context, for the rules
themselves do not determine whether they are applicable in every
conceivable factual circumstance. The second Section asserts that beach
access rules—again, in conventional terms—are distinct from the types of
“standards” on which New Jersey’s approach rests, the latter of which can
more flexibly and purposively accommodate complex and evolving
perspectives and goals at the sacrifice of determinacy.5 It then critiques this
view on the grounds that standards take shape through applications in
archetypical cases. The Part concludes in a third Section that the rule-based
and standards-based approaches to beach access are, in actuality, far more
similar than the traditional “determinacy of rules” and “flexibility of
standards” descriptions allow.
A. “RULES” ON THE BEACHFRONT
This Section articulates the historical development of what on their face
are, respectively, the exclusionary and unfettered access “rules” of Texas and
Oregon, respectively. Thereafter, it questions these rules’ supposed
determinacy upon reflection as to how they have been applied by courts in
4. See John A. Lovett, Love, Loyalty and the Louisiana Civil Code: Rules, Standards and Hybrid
Discretion in a Mixed Jurisdiction, 72 LA. L. REV. 923, 931–41 (2012) (describing the conventional
positions); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257, 267–71 (1974) (same); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1694–99, 1739 (1976) (same).
5. See Lovett, supra note 4, at 931–41.
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individual cases.
1. Robust Exclusion
Prior to Texas’s gaining independence, Mexican law prohibited the
colonization of the lengthy stretch of beach along Galveston Island—a
stretch that today is within geographical reach for more Texans than any
other given its proximity to the city of Houston—without approval of
Mexico’s President.6 When Texas became a republic in 1836, all lands on
the island thus were subject to significant public interests. In 1840, the
Republic granted private title to Galveston’s “West End” to Levi Jones and
Edward Hall.7 Soon after Texas entered the Union in 1845, the state’s
legislature confirmed the validity of the grant to Jones and Hall and many
similar grants statewide.8
From the date of the Jones and Hall grant, it remained an open question
which Texas lands above the low tide line, if any, still were impressed, even
where title rested in private hands, with public interests. In its 1958 decision
in Luttes v. State, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the State’s claim that,
under the public trust doctrine, these lands included the dry sand beach;
instead, it held that public trust rights existed only in those lands seaward of
the mean high-tide line.9 A year later, the Texas legislature passed a statute
purporting to establish enforcement procedures for instances in which the
state acquires an access easement to beach area landward of the mean hightide line via the common law doctrines of prescription, implication, and
custom.10 For several decades, state appellate courts conceived of these
common law easements quite broadly, and many dry-sand beaches titled in
private hands were thereby considered accessible to the public.11 In 2011,
though, the Texas Supreme Court in Severance v. Patterson12 reduced what
had come to be known as the 1959 “Open Beaches Act” to a misnomer.
According to Severance, every dry-sand beach in Texas that today is
titled in private hands actually is closed to the public unless the state proves
6. General Law of Colonization, art. 4 (Mex., Aug. 18, 1824), reprinted in 1 H.P.N. GAMMEL,
THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822–1897, at 97 (1898).
7. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 716 (Tex. 2012).
8. Id.
9. Luttes v. State, 324 S.W.2d 167, 169, 181 (Tex. 1958).
10. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.001(8) (West 2019).
11. See, e.g., Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923, 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (finding
an implied dedication “of the area seaward from the seaward side of the line of vegetation to the line of
mean high tide” to members of the public where successive owners “generally” allowed the public—at
least beyond a four year period in which a fence existed—“to use the beach each year”).
12. Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 705.
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the impossible: that, upon the lapsing of the extensive statute of limitations
afforded under the common law doctrines referenced in the Act, it has
acquired a public easement across a strip of sand that, in effect, is fixed to
specific metes and bounds.13 The impossibility of the state’s meeting this
burden results from two inter-related realities. First, the locations of the
vegetation line and the mean high-tide line (and, thus, the dry-sand beach
between the two) vary—sometimes markedly—most every year as a result
of coastal storms. Despite this variability, Severance focuses not on the
purpose of a public beach easement but, instead, its geographical
coordinates, going so far as to require the public to reestablish any previously
acquired easement simply because the precise grains of sand underfoot have
changed.14 Second, per Severance, where the state does not currently hold a
common law easement, private owners can construct physical barriers to the
public’s accessing Texas beaches, and thereby foreclose the establishment
of a new public easement or the reestablishment of any preexisting public
easement in perpetuity.15 In imposing on the state a burden that it could never
meet, the state supreme court’s interpretation and articulation of Texas law
effectively extended to coastal titleholders the right to wall out the public at
their will.
Texas’s approach assumes that a “single” owner of every oceanfront
parcel can be identified and that these owners have near absolute power to
control the dry sand sitting within the metes and bounds of their deeds. The
robust exclusionary rights afforded these owners are not filtered in terms of
the instances in which autonomy is exercised out of a desire to protect one’s
legitimate interests in, for example, preserving privacy or ensuring security,
or, alternatively, out of a desire to dominate or isolate others.16 On this view,
owners’ autonomy cannot be limited except, perhaps, in the most extreme
and temporary circumstances of necessity.17
13. Id. at 708, 714–15 (noting that “the dry beach often is privately owned” and rejecting the claim
that the public can acquire an easement thereon—by prescription, dedication, custom, or otherwise—that
“can ‘roll’ from a parcel previously encumbered . . . to a distinct parcel not so encumbered . . . [or] from
one portion of a parcel to another part of the same parcel”).
14. See, e.g., Richard J. McLaughlin, Rolling Easements as a Response to Sea Level Rise in
Coastal Texas: Current Status of the Law After Severance v. Patterson, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 365,
382–83 (2011); see also Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future
Proposed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305, 353–54 (2010).
15. Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 719 (interpreting the Open Beaches Act to “prohibit[] anyone from
creating, erecting, or constructing any ‘obstruction, barrier, or restraint that will interfere with the free
and unrestricted right of the public’ to access Texas beaches where the public has acquired a right of use
or easement” (emphasis added)).
16. See Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 154 (2009).
17. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
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2. Unfettered Access
An Oregon statute passed in 1967 allows for a perpetual public
easement to “free and uninterrupted use” of all privately-owned dry sand
beaches along the state’s 362-mile coastline.18 Contra Texas’s approach,
Oregon’s approach envisions the beach as offering a particularly special
forum for sociability.19 Oregon’s legislation sets forth no illusions that “the
anonymity of the bathing suit” creates marked opportunities for especially
meaningful interactions across status groups; publicly accessible beaches
cannot, in and of themselves, serve as a mystic cure for a highly stratified
society.20 However, it reflects an understanding of beaches as providing a
platform, if even for only the most casual perfunctory exchanges, for people
of different backgrounds and circumstances, borrowing the words of
Gregory Alexander, “to meet and engage with each other as concrete persons
rather than as imagined others.”21
The Oregon Supreme Court blessed the Oregon legislature’s approach
in 1969 in the face of a challenge by an owner who sought to wall off the
889, 941 (2009) (referring to temporary entry in situations of dire necessity); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems
with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 962 (1995) (“It is familiar to find rules that have explicit or implicit
exceptions for cases of necessity or emergency. It is unfamiliar to find rules without any such
exceptions.”).
18. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 674 (Or. 1969). Only Hawaii grants similar public
rights. See In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77–78 (Haw. 1968).
19. See James Freeman, Democracy and Danger on the Beach: Class Relations in the Public Space
of Rio de Janeiro, 5 SPACE & CULTURE 9, 19 (Feb. 2002). Sociability refers to our capacity “to recognize
and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; [and] to be
able to imagine the situation of another.” See Martha Nussbaum, Human Rights and Human Capabilities,
20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 21, 23 (2007).
20. See Freeman, supra note 19, at 19; see also Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm
in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 805–07 (2009).
21. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, PROPERTY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 196–98 (2018) (suggesting
that accessible public spaces offer the educative promise of “indiscriminate . . . mingling”); Alexander
Gazikas, The Low Water Mark for Beach Access: Defending Government Protection of Intertidal
Recreation as a Lawful Exercise of State Power, 17 U.N.H. L. REV. 287, 302 (2019) (referring to beaches
as serving an “equalizing function”); Marc R. Poirier, Modified Private Property: New Jersey’s Public
Trust Doctrine, Private Development and Exclusion, and Shared Public Uses of Natural Resources, 15
SE. ENVTL. L.J. 71, 103 (2006) (“Public places open to all have an important benefit, though one
intangible and difficult to quantify—they civilize us.”); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 779 (1986) (“[R]ecreation
can be a socializing and educative influence.”); Bethany Berger, Takings at the Water’s Edge (working
paper) (on file with author) (describing waterfront lands as “the gathering places of the world” and “an
outlet for ever more crowded and atomized residents to meet”). This perspective rings of Frederick Law
Olmstead’s assertion in the mid-nineteenth century that public parks offer space for socialization and
educational influence across socioeconomic classes. See FREDERICK OLMSTEAD, Public Parks and the
Enlargement of Towns, in CIVILIZING AMERICAN CITIES: A SELECTION OF FREDERICK LAW OLMSTEAD’S
WRITINGS ON CITY LANDSCAPES 74–81 (S. Sutton ed., 1971).
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beach in front of his coastal resort for his paying guests.22 In Thornton v.
Hay, the court found that the “first European settlers on [present-day
Oregon’s] shores” found the “aboriginal inhabitants” accessing and using the
beach for a variety of purposes and that the “newcomers” had continued
these customs through “actual practice[]” since statehood.23 While the court
said that the available evidence likely was sufficient to hold that the public
had acquired an easement to this specific resort owner’s beach by
prescription, it pointed to the “unbroken” custom of beach use statewide in
concluding that all of “the dry-sand area along the Pacific shore” is subject
to a public easement.24 By apparently allocating a property right to everyone
in the state to go to the beach of his or her choosing, Oregon’s beach access
law crafts a social life quite distinct from that created under Texas’s approach
by offering each person an expansive range of recreational and socialization
options.
3. Rules and Determinacy
Rules akin to Texas’s robust exclusionary command and Oregon’s
unfettered access policy generally are lauded for their determinacy.25
However, in actuality, such rules are only easy to apply—and thus only
determinate—in easy cases. These rules do not automatically determine the
scope of their own application when hard cases inevitably come along.26
22. Thornton, 462 P.2d at 673.
23. Id. at 673–74.
24. Id. at 676–77; see also Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456–57 (Or. 1993)
(holding that Oregon’s customary public rights in ocean beaches precluded a takings claim challenging
regulations
limiting
development
on
beaches
titled
in
private
parties);
Timothy M. Mulvaney, Foreground Principles, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 837, 839 (2013) (discussing the
likes of Stevens in the course of questioning the self-contained nature of the background principles inquiry
in regulatory takings jurisprudence). Applications of the doctrine of custom ordinarily involve remarking
on the circumstances and context in which a longstanding use by the non-owning public will transform
an owner’s right to exclude into a right of access that the public can comfortably expect will continue into
the future. See, e.g., City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Roma, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974). Yet
Thornton’s application fulfills the public need to access and use beaches by categorically deeming all
portions of all beaches in the state open to the public on the rather implausible deduction—at least based
on the limited record before the court—that the public regularly had accessed each portion of each and
every one of those beaches in the past. Indeed, in dicta, the Oregon Supreme Court recognized as much
in a later decision in making the seemingly contradictory assertions that “[w]e do not retreat today from
anything said in [Thornton]” and “nothing in [Thornton] fairly can be read to have established beyond
dispute a public claim by virtue of ‘custom’ to the right to recreational use of the entire Oregon coast, no
matter what the topography of a particular place.” McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d 714, 724 (Or. 1989).
25. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1688–89; Lovett, supra note 4, at 926; Carol M. Rose, Crystals
and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 590–92 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62–63 (1992).
26. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1286 (2008); Sunstein, supra note 17, at 961; KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
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Instead, in new contexts litigants force judges to perform the task of
interpreting rules to determine whether those rules apply.27 For an instructive
if gruesome example, a New York court famously declined in Riggs v.
Palmer to follow the decedent’s will, made in due form, stating that all of
his property would pass to his grandson, Elmer Palmer, when Palmer
murdered his grandfather to accelerate this inheritance.28
In performing this interpretive task in a given instance, a judge must
exercise moral and practical judgment by looking to the reasons the state
adopted the rule in the first place, the values and norms that rule supposedly
protects, the consequences it sought to promote, and the situations within
which it was supposed to operate, as well as any countervailing norms and
interests that might not have been implicated or obvious in the factual setting
that led to the creation of the rule in the first place.29 A rule crumbles when
judges cannot live with the result that mechanical application of that rule in
a new context dictates.30 In this way, rules and standards are not as distinct
with regard to determinacy as they appear on the conventional account.31
In the beach access context, consider, for instance, the acontextual
BRAMBLE BUSH 71 (1930). Mark Kelman goes so far as to say that “all cases are hard cases.” MARK
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 23 (1987).
27. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 817 (1989)
(“[J]udges are an interpretive community conscious of their obligation to act as independent moral
choosers for the good of society, in light of what that society is and can become. . . . [T]here are no rules
that can be understood apart from their context.”).
28
Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 191 (N.Y. 1889).
29. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1369, 1427 (2013).
30. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 25, at 578 (“[S]traightforward common law crystalline rules have
been muddied repeatedly by . . . equitable second-guessing.”); Sullivan, supra note 25, at 54 (“[T]o avoid
injustice at the margin, legislatures and courts simply invent end-runs around [rules].”); Sunstein, supra
note 17, at 957 (“Often rules will be too crude, since they run up against intransigent beliefs about how
particular cases should be resolved.”).
31. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1710 (“The different values that people commonly associate
with the formal modes of rule and standard are conveyed by the emotive or judgmental words that the
advocates of the two positions use in the course of debate about a particular issue.”); Amnon Lehavi, The
Dynamic Law of Property: Theorizing the Role of Legal Standards, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 81, 105 (2010)
(“Even the most careful legal design would be unable to predict, allocate, and decide in advance all
possible states-of-the-world regarding the bundle of property rights.”); Lovett, supra note 4, at 937
(suggesting that, given the blurred nature of rules and standards, the fairness, efficiency, and democratic
governance justifications for one design versus the other often “dissolve into irreconcilable, and perhaps
ultimately rhetorical, conflict”); Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 823, 828–32 (1991); Sullivan, supra note 25, at 61 (explaining that the
“distinctions between rules and standards . . . mark a continuum, not a divide”). Cass Sunstein describes
the rules-standards continuum as involving progressively more discretionary steps from untrammeled
discretion (at one pole) to rules to “rules with excuses” to presumptions to factors to standards to
guidelines (at the other pole). Sunstein, supra note 17, at 960–68.
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application of Texas’s seemingly robust exclusionary rule if the City of
Galveston conveyed to private parties all beaches on the island that currently
are titled in public hands. Strict adherence to this “rule” effectively would
limit the public’s access to and, thus, use of all lands flowed by the tide of
the Gulf of Mexico—which, incontrovertibly, are held in trust for the
public—to those individuals who have access permission from a waterfront
owner or who can secure access to those lands by water or air transport.
Consider, too, how an acontextual application of Oregon’s doctrine of
custom would leave unaddressed the reality that there are longstanding
practices that, when replicated moving forward, may be contrary to public
need as conceived in light of changing times and conditions. For a simple
example, contemplate the claim, levied in some states in the past, that the
public customarily used the beach for automobile travel.32 Faced with such
a claim today, it is not evident that judges would be doing their job if they
cemented the public’s ability to continue this use in perpetuity merely
because of its historical exercise and without reflection on the purposes of
the practice and the values served by the perpetuation—or cessation—of it.33
These hypothetical examples illustrate that determining whether rules
should apply in hard cases requires standards. The laws in Texas and Oregon
are, of course, grounded in different presumptions. The essential if implicit
question, though, in each of these jurisdictions is the same: whether the
reasons behind the exclusion or access requested are sufficient under the
circumstances to rebut the standing presumption. Judges who failed to
acknowledge as much merely would be assuming that “rules” have a builtin structure that makes them easy to state, and shielding their eyes from their
unavoidable task of exercising normative judgment, all the while, if
unintentionally, staking out a normative position.34 Texas judges executing
their role properly, however, would confront head-on the consequences of a
purely privatized coastline to determine whether that state of affairs should
be respected or, instead, excepted from the rule in a given case that may have
similar though not identical facts. Similarly, Oregon judges executing their
role properly would confront head-on the evolving understandings of
environmental science that have illuminated the damage vehicular traffic can
32. See, e.g., Trepanier v. County of Volusia, 965 So. 2d 276, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
(“Driving and parking on the beach . . . may be viewed as a customary use in its own right based on . . . a
historic custom of using the beach as a thoroughfare.”).
33. But see Sir John Baker, Prescriptive Customs in English Law, 1300–1800, in 33 LIMITATION
AND PRESCRIPTION (Harry Dondorp, David Ibbetson & Eltjo J. H. Schrage eds., 2019) (noting that, under
English law, an act declared customary remains so unless and until lifted by statute).
34. Judges, therefore, are never “simple rule applier[s].” Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1770.
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inflict on coastal ecological systems.35 That context matters does not suggest
that rules are useless; rather, it suggests that rules are useful when tailored to
circumstances that we have some passable ability to predict the contours
of—though never with absolute precision—in advance.36
B. “STANDARDS” ON THE BEACHFRONT
This Section—again, with attention to historical developments—
distinguishes the exclusionary and unfettered access rules of, respectively,
Texas and Oregon from the standards-based framework of New Jersey, the
latter of which is rooted in the public trust doctrine. It contends that the
flexibility often attributed to such a standards-based framework is not as
expansive as the conventional account suggests.
1. Reasonable Access
New Jersey was established in 1664 as a real estate investment
company, with a grant of property from King Charles II to his brother James,
the Duke of York.37 James then conveyed those rights to two proprietors,
Lord John Berkeley and Sir George Carteret.38 Because, under English law,
the King could not convey any rights that he held in trust for the public, those
rights were not conveyed to Berkeley and Carteret, but rather were retained
by the Crown. Accordingly, under the public trust doctrine, no property
owner in present-day New Jersey ever possessed these rights beyond the
35. See, e.g., Chelsea Harvey, Why You Really Need to Stop Driving on Beaches, WASH. POST,
(June 3, 2015, 12:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/06/03/
why-you-really-need-to-stop-driving-on-beaches [perma.cc/4CBW-XEF6].
36. See Shawn J. Bayern, Against Certainty, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 55–58 (2012) (explaining
that the application of rules requires interpretative judgments about the contexts within which that rule
should apply); Radin, supra note 27, at 809 (“Over time the ‘same’ action in response to the ‘same’
directive can go from being compelled by a rule to not being compelled by a rule, or vice versa.”);
Sunstein, supra note 17, at 1022 (“The need for interpretation during encounters with concrete cases
means that ex post assessments of some sort are an inescapable part of law.”).
37. See Graham v. Township of Edison, 173 A.2d 403, 405 (N.J. 1961). The next several
paragraphs draw in considerable part from Timothy M. Mulvaney & Brian Weeks, “Waterlocked”:
Public Access to New Jersey’s Coastline, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 579 (2007).
38. Berkeley and Carteret had visions of establishing a feudal society in which they would, as the
land’s lords, collect tributes from its occupants. See Grant of Land from James, Duke of York, to John
Lord Berkeley, Baron of Straton, & Sir George Carteret (June 24, 1664),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nj01.asp [perma.cc/HH9A-CK93]. That the occupiers later
successfully resisted Berkeley and Carteret’s oppressive scheme by claiming that they held freehold title
as a result of their laboring to cultivate and develop the land does not alter the fact that title to all property
in New Jersey today is based on and can be traced back to these original conveyances from King Charles
II. See BRENDAN MCCONVILLE, THESE DARING DISTURBERS OF THE PUBLIC PEACE: THE STRUGGLE FOR
PROPERTY AND POWER IN EARLY NEW JERSEY (1999). It, of course, is the uncomfortable and undeniable
truth that all “freehold titles” in New Jersey, like the proprietary claims themselves, were created in
forcible disregard of the interests of the members of the Indian nations who originally lived on the land.
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reigning monarch of England and, following the transfer of royal rights to
state legislatures at the close of the Revolutionary War, the State of New
Jersey itself.
In its 1821 decision in Arnold v. Mundy, New Jersey’s Supreme Court
explicitly recognized that these public trust rights included access to and use
of navigable waters and tidal shores for purposes of fishing and transporting
persons and commercial goods.39 It follows that these public rights protected
under the public trust doctrine, unless somehow specifically and
appropriately abrogated by the State with respect to a given parcel in the
intervening period, sit in the chain of title to all properties that include
navigable waters or border tidal waterways statewide.40 Thus, where the
State conveys title to navigable waters or tidal shores to private parties, those
parties’ interests, per Arnold, generally remain subject to the public’s rights
of access and use.
After Arnold, the public trust doctrine case law in New Jersey remained
relatively quiet through the first half of the twentieth century. During that
time, the state’s urban waterfronts were densely developed with largely
industrial uses, while several oceanfront cities with sandy beaches and
railroad access—such as Asbury Park, Long Branch, Atlantic City, and Cape
May—grew into popular resorts.41 Outside of these urban areas and resorts,
though, the state’s beaches remained largely undeveloped and were used
only for fishing, fowling, and associated activities.42 The New Jersey
coastline changed rapidly after World War II, though, due to the popularity
of the automobile and improvements to New Jersey’s highways, including
the modernization of tunnels from New York City and construction of the
Garden State Parkway.43 In short order, New Jersey’s entire 128 miles of
sandy beaches had come within reach of the region’s increasingly prosperous
middle class.44
39. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435
(1892); Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 411–12 (1842).
40. Some courts seem to suggest that the state may terminate public trust rights by transferring
public trust property to a private party via a deed that expressly states that the transfer is unencumbered
by such rights. See, e.g., Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. Rhode Island, 657 A.2d 1038,
1040 (R.I. 1995). In New Jersey, though, “the sovereign never waives its right to regulate the use of public
trust property.” Karam v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 705 A.2d 1221, 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998), aff’d 723 A.2d 943 (N.J. 1999); see also Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005)
(holding that the rights encompassed under the public trust doctrine are inalienable).
41. DOMINICK MAZZAGETTI, THE JERSEY SHORE: THE PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE OF A NATIONAL
TREASURE 65–66, 81–82, 107–09 (2018).
42. Id. at 212–14.
43. Id. at 260–64.
44. Id. at 254.
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Starting in the 1970s, the state’s courts were called upon more and more
to resolve disputes between private property owners and the newly expanded
beach-going public. These courts sided with the public at most every turn. In
1972, the state’s supreme court recognized that the State owns not only all
tidal waterways and the underlying submerged lands, but also the shore
seaward of the mean high-tide line.45 Soon thereafter, it held that a
municipality may not restrict use of a portion of its beach to its residents.46
And, a bit later, an appellate court concluded that municipalities may not
discriminate against nonresidents in their beach fee schedules or other beach
access or use policies.47 These rulings, the New Jersey Supreme Court would
explain in its 1984 decision in Matthews v. Bay Head, rested on a perception
of the public trust doctrine not as a “fixed or static” principle but instead one
to “be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the
public it was created to benefit.”48
The Matthews court made two important declarations: First, public trust
uses in New Jersey reach beyond fishing and transportation to recreation and
socialization, and, second, the character of the property at issue, not merely
the identity of the titleholder as private or public, determines whether and
the extent to which the public has rights to recreate and socialize landward
of the mean high-tide line.49
As to this latter point, the beaches in dispute in Matthews, spanning the
entire 1.5-mile oceanfront of the Borough of Bay Head, were privately
owned but managed by a private association—the Bay Head Improvement
Association (“Association”)—that provided services similar in type and
scale to those provided by many coastal municipalities.50 The sole purpose
of the Association was to offer and manage beach access and use for the
benefit of the Borough’s residents, with Association staff serving as
lifeguards, maintaining the beach, and selling beach badges required for
45. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 1972); see
also Lusardi v. Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass’n, 430 A.2d 881, 886–88 (N.J. 1981).
46. Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 574 (N.J. 1978); Hyland v. Borough of
Allenhurst, 393 A.2d 579, 581–82 (N.J. 1978) (concluding that a municipality abused its power by barring
beachgoers from use of municipally maintained toilet facilities adjacent to a public beach).
47. Slocum v. Borough of Belmar, 569 A.2d 312, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (declaring
a municipality breached its fiduciary duties to the public by raising beach admittance fees rather than
property taxes to generate revenue solely to benefit its residents and by charging fees that were
“disproportionately and inequitably” higher on weekends, when mostly nonresidents use the beaches, as
opposed to lower fees on weekdays when mostly residents use the beaches).
48. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984) (quoting
Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 47).
49. Id. at 368–69.
50. Id. at 359.
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entry in the summer months.51 The Borough, in turn, supported the
Association through cooperative municipal resolutions, free office space,
tax-exempt real estate, free liability insurance coverage, and public funding
of beach protection structures.52
Viewing the Association “in its totality,” including attending to the
Association’s “purpose, relationship with the municipality, communal
characteristic, activities, and virtual monopoly over the Bay Head
beachfront,” the court deemed the entity “quasi-public.”53 On a beach held
by a quasi-public entity, concluded the court, “[t]he public must be afforded
reasonable access to the foreshore as well as a suitable area for recreation on
the dry sand.”54 To determine the extent of public access to and use of the
dry sand required in this context, Matthews identified several non-exclusive
considerations that it deemed relevant, including (1) the location of the dry
sand in relation to the foreshore, (2) the usage of the upland dry sand area by
the private owner, (3) the extent and availability of publicly owned upland
dry sand areas in the vicinity, and (4) the nature and extent of the public
demand.55
Matthews does not present a formula into which one simply can plug
defined variables to determine automatically whether a given beach should
be deemed quasi-public and, if so, the precise extent of public access and use
that should be available. However, the decision sets an important baseline
for instances in which private entities and municipalities are intertwined in a
manner that resembles the symbiotic relationship between the Association
and the Borough. Moreover, it establishes a framework for contextualized
judgments in future borderline cases in which private entities might be
conceived as standing in the shoes of a municipality, if in less complete terms
than was the case in Matthews itself. Still further, the holding, while saying
nothing explicit about beaches owned by private parties distinctly
independent of any government entity, sent an important signal of inclusivity
on New Jersey’s oceanfront.
The circumstances surrounding a rather unique non-profit venture
illustrate both the progress and limitations of Matthews’ concentration on the
character of the property at issue. In 2002, an ambitious collection of young
surfers founded an initiative known as the Habitat Paddle to Build that
ultimately would gain considerable media attention up and down the eastern
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 365.
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seaboard.56 Over the course of a single month, the group planned to take on
the grueling task of paddling surfboards the full length of New Jersey’s
coastline in an effort to raise funds and awareness for the charitable home
building organization, Habitat for Humanity.57 In advance of the trip, the
group contacted the U.S. Coast Guard to advise it of their intentions. The
Coast Guard’s Marine Event Coordinator responded that the group’s plans
did not implicate federal strictures because the paddling journey would not
trigger any of the relevant federal criteria relating to vessel size, water quality
protections, or shipping interference.58 This official did, though, close his
letter with a reminder that the paddlers’ efforts would need to be conducted
in accord with all “state and local law and regulation that applies during the
time and at the location of the event.”59
Based on a first-hand account of one of the paddlers, who penned a daily
journal of the trek for a New Jersey newspaper, it is readily apparent that it
was the Matthews line of state and local law and regulation to which the
group had been referred by the Coast Guard that allowed the project to
succeed.60 The group spent four weeks traversing across beaches to get to
the water; walking the shores with a Habitat for Humanity banner; and
routinely stopping for a rest, a snack, or to chat about the organization’s
mission with thousands of locals and visitors alike on myriad beaches,
including those of Bay Head and multiple other towns with quasi-public
beach management arrangements akin to that at issue in Matthews.61 By and
large, the paddlers’ access to and use of New Jersey’s beaches was welcomed
with open arms.62
The group did, though, encounter stretches of beach that had been
walled off to the public by the gates and security guards of privately-owned
oceanfront homes, hotels, condominiums, and beach clubs. In some of these
instances, the paddlers were able to gain permission from the owners to step
onto the beach; in others, they stayed in the water and the area flowed by the
56. See, e.g., “Habitat Paddle to Build” A Very Worthy Cause, ASBURY PARK PRESS, June 4, 2006,
at H14; Katia Raina, Friends Paddle N.J. Coast to Help Habitat for Humanity, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY,
July 13, 2002, at C1; Suzanne Zionts, Surf Group Raises Money to Build Homes for Needy, COURIERPOST, July 4, 2002, at 5B.
57. See Zionts, supra note 56.
58. Letter from Geoffrey M. Pagels, Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Coast Guard, Marine Event
Coordinator, to Timothy M. Mulvaney, Professor of Law & Assoc. Dean for Faculty Research, Tex.
A&M Sch. of Law (February 10, 2002) (on file with author).
59. Id.
60. Habitat Paddle to Build Journal Series, OCEAN COUNTY OBSERVER, June 30, 2002–July 28,
2002 (on file with author).
61. See id.; Zionts, supra note 56.
62. Habitat Paddle to Build Journal Series, supra note 60.
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tide; and, in still others, they were forced to pack up the team van and drive,
sometimes a sizable distance, to the next public access point.63 Several years
after the conclusion of their journey, the New Jersey Supreme Court would
issue its landmark beach access decision in a case, Raleigh Avenue Beach
Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., involving one such private enclave.64
The dispute in Raleigh Avenue had begun unexceptionally with local
resident Anthony Labrosciano exiting the area flowed by the tide—
following, presumably, a stroll or a swim—onto a segment of beach owned
by the Atlantis Beach Club (“Atlantis”).65 Mr. Labrosciano proceeded to
walk across the dry sand in an effort to leave the beach at the foot of Raleigh
Avenue, which presented the most direct route to his home.66 Atlantis’s
security detail asked him to stay off the beach.67 When he refused, Atlantis
called the police and ultimately pursued a trespass charge.68 A citizens’
group, the Raleigh Avenue Beach Association, of which Mr. Labrosciano
was a member, filed its own suit asserting that Atlantis was depriving people
of their coastal access and use rights.69 The State of New Jersey immediately
sided with the citizens’ group in charging that Atlantis’s exclusionary
practices were inconsistent with the public trust doctrine.70
Unlike the quasi-public beach association in Matthews, Atlantis was a
distinctly private organization. The Raleigh Avenue court, though, took the
significant step of extending application of the Matthews considerations to
beaches titled in such private hands. It asserted that “reasonable access to the
sea is integral to the public trust doctrine” and that use of the dry sand beach
is “ancillary” to use of the ocean regardless of the identity of the party who
holds underlying title to that beach.71 The decision rests on an evaluative
63. See E-mail from Christopher McCann to Timothy M. Mulvaney, Professor of Law & Assoc.
Dean for Faculty Research, Tex. A&M Sch. of Law (October 3, 2020) (on file with author) (recounting
first-hand experiences on the Habitat Paddle to Build).
64. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 113–25 (N.J. 2005).
65. Id. at 116.
66. Id.
67. Id. Atlantis’s demanding that Mr. Labrosciano stay off the beach is a mere illustration of the
Atlantis’s exclusionary efforts. See, e.g., E-mail from Brian Weeks, Deputy Attorney Gen., State of N.J.,
to Timothy M. Mulvaney, Professor of Law & Assoc. Dean for Faculty Research, Tex. A&M Sch. of
Law (October 1, 2020) (on file with author) (recounting, in the course of recollecting his investigative
efforts as counsel for the State of New Jersey in the Raleigh Avenue litigation, an Atlantis security guard’s
precluding a couple that had walked from the water across the dry sand on Atlantis’s property without
incident from leaving the beach through Atlantis’s gate).
68. Raleigh Avenue, 879 A.2d at 116.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 120. The Raleigh Avenue decision stated that allowable beach fees may cover only the
actual costs of basic beach services, including lifeguards, trash removal, showers, toilets, and
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term—what one scholar describes as a “reasonable access norm”—that
provokes reflection by titleholders and beachgoers alike about what behavior
is acceptable and expected by others in a given context.72
Raleigh Avenue’s reasonable access approach is distinct from the
seemingly “crystalline” Texas tenet that a person who holds title to the drysand portion of a beach may wall out others from that beach at will.73 It also
differs from the facial stiffness of Oregon’s imperative in that it does not
purport to fortify historical public uses for all time.74 Raleigh Avenue, in
addition to reiterating the importance of the character of the property in
evaluating the extent to which the public has rights to access and use dry
sand beaches titled in private hands, serves as a powerful symbol for the
proposition that no owner can exercise control over property in a way that
unreasonably interferes with contemporary public needs concomitant to the
enjoyment of public waterways.75
administrative costs. Id. at 118, 124–25. In essence, the court approved a two-tiered fee structure: one for
members in private facilities and one for the general public in the public area. The private club, Atlantis,
may charge whatever the market will bear for use of its private facilities, such as cabanas, umbrellas,
gazebos, etc., without regulation under the public trust doctrine. Such fees remain subject to other
government police power regulations, such as taxation, consumer protection, health and safety laws, and
regulation of the sale of alcoholic beverages. However, Atlantis may not appropriate public assets and
use them as if they were the private assets of a for-profit entity.
72. See ALEXANDER, supra note 21, at 180, 188–90. Upon application of the Matthews
considerations, the Raleigh Avenue court deemed the entire Atlantis beach—approximately 480 feet in
length along the water’s edge and 340 feet wide when measured from the water’s edge to Atlantis’s
landward-most property line—subject to public access and use. In support of this conclusion, the Raleigh
Avenue court pointed to the lack of a public beach in the municipality, the fact that the public accessway
nearest Raleigh Avenue was more than a half-mile away, high demand from hundreds of residents
immediately inland of the beach, and the longstanding prior free public use of the beach. The two
dissenting justices generally agreed that the Matthews considerations should be extended to cases
involving beaches titled in private hands that do not have any connection to a municipality, but, in
applying those considerations, would have afforded the public access to and use of just a ten-foot-wide
strip of dry sand along the length of Atlantis’s beach. See Raleigh Avenue, 879 A.2d at 125–29 (Wallace,
J., dissenting).
73. See Lovett, supra note 4, at 929; Rose, supra note 25, at 578.
74. In this comparative sense, Raleigh Avenue makes evident that resorting to a standard does not
automatically translate into “weaker” protection of property rights. See Lehavi, supra note 31, at 113.
75. The Raleigh Avenue court’s rationale mirrors in basic respects a concurring opinion by Oregon
Supreme Court Justice Arno H. Denecke in the Oregon case of Thornton v. Hay described above. Justice
Denecke wrote:
I agree with the decision of the majority; however, I disagree with basing the decision upon the
English doctrine of “customary rights.” . . . I base the public's right upon the following factors:
(1) long usage by the public of the dry sands area, not necessarily on all the Oregon beaches,
but wherever the public uses the beach; (2) a universal and long held belief by the public in the
public's right to such use; (3) long and universal acquiescence by the upland owners in such
public use; and (4) the extreme desirability to the public of the right to the use of the dry sands.
When this combination exists, as it does here, I conclude that the public has the right to use the
dry sands. . . . “The law regarding the public use of property held in part for the benefit of the
public must change as the public need changes.”
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2. Standards and Determinacy
Adherents to the conventional rules-versus-standards account described
at the outset of this Part are likely to characterize New Jersey’s reasonable
access standard as indeterminate.76 There are at least two counter-charges to
this characterization. First, to the extent this standard is less determinate than
the rules of Texas and Oregon (which, as asserted above, is no foregone
conclusion given that the scope of the Texas and Oregon rules are often
themselves indeterminate without attention to context), it may well be
acceptable; after all, ensuring determinacy does not trump reaching the right
result in all circumstances. Second, though—and as this Section sets out in
more detail below—the very charge of wholesale indeterminacy is
misplaced.77 Just as robust exclusionary and unfettered access rules are, as
noted above, less determinate than the conventional account makes them out
to be, a reasonable access standard is more determinate than that account
generally allows.78 Key precedential applications give standards of this sort
their shape.79 The following pages offer two illustrative exemplars of how
New Jersey’s reasonable access standard achieves some modicum of
determinacy by reference to baseline cases.
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 678–79 (Or. 1969) (Denecke, J., concurring) (emphasis
added) (quoting 1 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATER AND ALLIED
PROBLEMS 202 (Robert Emmet Clark ed., 1967)).
76. See Radin, supra note 27, at 796 (“If rules do not tie judges’ hands with their logical or analytic
application, the traditional view is that judges will have personal discretion in how to apply the law.”).
77. See Singer, supra note 29, at 1387–88.
78. Id. at 1390. Indeed, standards may in some instances be more determinate than rules. See, e.g.,
Al Katz & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Pins Jurisdiction, the Vagueness Doctrine, and the Rule of Law, 53 IND.
L.J. 1, 31–33 (1977).
79. See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 984–85 (“Encounters with particular cases will confound the
view that things really have been fully settled in advance. . . . Even laws that appear confining, and quite
rule-like, may require interpreters to give them content at the point of application.”); id. at 989
(“[C]ategories receive their human meaning by reference to typical instances. When we are asked whether
a particular thing falls within a general category, we examine whether that thing is like or unlike the
typical or defining instances.”); Lehavi, supra note 31, at 87 (explaining how a standard “delegates power
to courts to fill [the standard] with content through interpretation”); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing
Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1223 (2010)
(suggesting that where “like circumstances have presented themselves before, and precedent has been
established to the effect that certain specific behavior falls inside or outside the directive, the citizen may
draw the simple analogy and follow suit”). Similarly, lawyers do not face extreme difficulties in advising
their clients on the viability of, for instance, nuisance or negligence claims, despite the standard-like
nature of the reasonableness provisions that drive those doctrines. See Singer, supra note 29, at 1389.
Where core archetypes are not instructive, the moral reflection that standards prompt is a valuable feature,
not a bug, of a standards-based approach.
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i. Limiting Access
The matter of Bubis v. Kassin arose in the Village of Loch Arbour, a
small municipality consisting of a beach approximately 300 feet deep along
1000 feet of ocean frontage.80 Of this frontage, a private citizen, Joyce
Kassin, held title to the southern-most 300 foot by 650 foot portion and the
Village held title to the remainder.81 In earlier litigation, Kassin had been
ordered to provide an access easement across her land to the water.82 In this
follow-up suit, Sophie Bubis—who lived across the street and to the
immediate west of Kassin—sought a declaration of her rights to use the dry
sand portion of the Kassin property for recreational and social purposes.83
In Bubis, an appellate court deemed it important that Kassin already
provided a public easement allowing transit across her land to the water;
permitted, in accord with an earlier court order, some public uses within a
small corridor of dry sand along the entire ocean frontage of her property at
all times; and, on the one to two days per year in which the Village’s public
beach reaches capacity, allowed the public to use the entire beach on the
northern-most 300 foot by 100 foot portion of her property.84 In applying
Raleigh Avenue, the court held that Kassin need not provide public access to
and use of the dry sand beach beyond that already provided in light of its
findings that (1) the Village had an adjacent public beach “sufficient to
satisfy the ‘public demand;’ ” and (2) unlike the beach club in Raleigh
Avenue, Kassin had never used the property for commercial purposes or
charged fees to any of her guests or members of the public, both of whom
nevertheless benefit from the lifeguarding and other services she offers on
the beach.85
ii. Extending Access
During the period in which the Bubis litigation took place, state
representatives—in the course of evaluating a private beach club’s routine
dune-maintenance permit application—uncovered a document relating to
beach access in a municipality several miles to the north of the Village of
Loch Arbour. This document would serve as the focal point of future
litigation over the implementation of Raleigh Avenue’s precepts.86 Via this
80. Bubis v. Kassin, 960 A.2d 779, 781 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 782.
84. Id. at 781–82, 786–87.
85. Id.
86. See E-mail from Brian Weeks, Deputy Attorney Gen., State of N.J., to Timothy M. Mulvaney,
Professor of Law & Assoc. Dean for Faculty Research, Tex. A&M Sch. of Law (January 13, 2018) (on
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document, which was signed by a representative of the beach club and an
Assistant Commissioner in the State’s Department of Environmental
Protection in 1993, the beach club purported to grant (1) a construction
easement to the State to enter its property “to pump, place, transport and
spread sand beach fill” on its property as part of a beach nourishment project;
(2) “a continuing easement for the purpose of conducting periodic beach
nourishment” during the anticipated duration of the project; and (3) “a
perpetual easement for a right of limited public access” allowing only northsouth pedestrian transit along a narrow corridor at the new, post-beach-renourishment water’s edge.87 The State would soon come to learn that this
former Assistant Commissioner had signed nearly identical agreements with
eight other private beach clubs in the Borough.88
The State filed suit seeking reformation of these agreements in light of
the intervening holding in Raleigh Avenue indicating that upland sand on
property owned by a private entity is subject to reasonable public access and
use under the public trust doctrine.89 Under the caption Chiesa v. D. Lobi
Enterprises, an appellate panel remarked that “public policy reflects the
common conscience and changes in its demands with the needs and widely
held feelings of the times.”90 Sources of such public policy, explained the
court, include judicial decisions involving “new applications of old
principles,” like that in Raleigh Avenue.91 The court upheld a trial judge’s
decision deeming the limited public access provision in the 1993 agreement
“contrary to [the] public interest and unenforceable.”92
iii. Archetypes
Bubis and D. Lobi Enterprises do not offer private titleholders and
would-be beachgoers absolute certainty on the extent of beach access and
use to which the public is entitled statewide. However, Bubis’s conclusion
that portions of a noncommercial beach owned by a single person adjacent
to a public beach sufficient to accommodate demand can reasonably remain
file with author).
87. Chiesa v. D. Lobi Enters., No. A-6070-09T3, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2218, at *1 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 28, 2012).
88. See MaryAnn Spoto, N.J. Appellate Panel Tells Sea Bright Club It Must Open Beach to
Everyone, NEWJERSEY.COM (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.nj.com/politics/2012/09/nj_appellate_panel_
tells_sea_b.html [perma.cc/6TKD-89CX].
89. D. Lobi Enters., 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2218, at *1–2.
90. Id. at *17.
91. Id at *17; see also id. at *18 (“Certainly, after the Raleigh Avenue ruling, both parties to the
1993 Agreement should have recognized that the limited public access to the 80 feet of oceanfront tidal
property the Club owned might be questionable. . . .”).
92. Id. at *2.
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part of that private owner’s exclusive domain and D. Lobi Enterprises’
resolution that the access and use terms set out in a 1993 agreement with
commercial beach clubs related to a publicly-funded beach replenishment
project were unreasonable provide shape to Raleigh Avenue’s reasonable
access norm and the deliberations that it facilitates.93 Generalizations of this
nature reveal that New Jersey’s reasonable access standard is not especially
distinct from the seemingly more concrete rules common in other states,
which, as noted above, themselves operate through interpretation of their
scope as they are applied to resolve actual disputes.94
C. ON REFLECTION: DETERMINACY AND BEACH ACCESS
The foregoing pages have explored what, on their face, are beach access
policies that take the form of rules (grounded in robust exclusionary rights
or unfettered access privileges) or standards (reasonable access). The former
often are generally extolled for their determinacy, while the latter generally
are praised for their flexibility. However, this Part has contended that these
features are not nearly so static. When new contexts arise, a robust
exclusionary rule or an unfettered access rule does not automatically
determine the scope of its own application; instead, titleholders and
beachgoers reflect on whether exclusionary or access policies apply in this
new context and, where necessary, call on judges to determine whether to
craft an exception, fashion a qualification, or recognize a distinction. Rules,
that is, are less determinate (and more flexible) than they appear on their
face. Meanwhile, standards, like New Jersey’s reasonable access approach,
93. In this respect, the New Jersey experience mirrors that of Scotland. In 2003, Scotland passed
a land reform act that created a presumption of “responsible access” across not only coastal areas but a
large swath of the country’s interior. Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, (ASP 2) § 2(1) (“A person has
access rights only if they are exercised responsibly.”). The statute relied on context-sensitive standards to
address several key issues, including the extent to which landowners can claim a right of privacy around
their dwellings that eclipses the right of responsible access and make decisions about land uses that might
impede unrestrained access. See John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform
(Scotland) Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 777–90 (2011). The Scottish courts have, over time, given
these standards content. Id. at 790–815. After an especially thorough exposition of the Scottish courts’
engagement, Professor Lovett concludes that “a property regime that pivots on an ex ante presumption of
access can incorporate exceptions to this presumption that employ open-textured standards of
reasonableness,” id. at 817, without generating unnecessarily high “information processing costs and
coordination costs” that critics anticipated at the outset, id. at 742.
94. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
611–16 (1992). John Lovett asserts that “litigants (and their lawyers) who confront broad standards just
after their enactment bear considerably higher litigation and uncertainty costs than do litigants who
confront the same standards 20 or 30 years later, after the courts (and the legislature) have chiseled them
down into more crystalline rules.” Lovett, supra note 4, at 929. But see Radin, supra note 27, at 814–15
(contending that strong social agreement in advance of the development of case law can serve as a
sufficient marker).
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that appear open-ended take shape through applications that reveal core
archetypes and, therefore, result in “holdings” that take a form similar to the
rules that were thought to be so clear in Oregon and Texas. In sum, then, a
state’s options on how to allocate property interests at the water’s edge—be
it via a regime of robust exclusionary rights, unfettered access privileges, or
reasonable access—are more similar than the conventional account allows.
II. RULES AND STANDARDS: TRANSPARENCY
The previous Part issued a challenge in the beach access context to the
conventional view that rule-like systems are far superior to standard-like
systems with regards to the extent to which they produce determinate
outcomes. Despite the stark variations in the form and substance of these
legal directives on their face, rule-like systems—as illustrated by the beach
access laws of Texas and Oregon—in actuality do not, respectively, ignore
the value of beaches as fora for sociability or deem that value of such
significance that it trumps all others in all cases. Similarly, standard-based
systems—as exemplified by New Jersey’s beach access law—do not leave
everything up for grabs; rather, some semblance of determinacy emerges
through applications of the standards in core cases.
If, indeed, these various jurisdictional approaches to beach access are
more similar than the conventional determinacy thesis suggests, how else
might the approaches be meaningfully distinguished? One possibility,
emphasized here, lies in the virtue of transparency.95 The first Section below
explains that rule-like systems have been lauded for their transparency, in
the sense that they are more likely to lead decisionmakers to treat like cases
alike and thereby minimize arbitrariness or bias.96 The second Section
contends, though, that standard-based systems offer their own version of
transparency that is grounded in promoting dialogue, demanding
accountability, and insisting on justification. Rules may not be transparent in
these ways that standards are because rule interpretation, if presented as mere
rule application, may obfuscate the reasons for applying or distinguishing a
rule in a hard case.
A. THE TRANSPARENCY OF BEACH ACCESS RULES
Some scholars would understand beach access rules as tending to
declare the meaning of any operative principles upfront and, thereafter,
95. For one of many concise, insightful summaries of the wide range of abstract arguments for and
against the pro-rules and pro-standards positions, see KELMAN, supra note 26, at 40–45.
96. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 69
(1983).
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concentrate decisionmaking on neutral categorizations that are based on ex
ante conditions.97 Such an approach allows those operative principles to selfimplement—independently and objectively—moving forward,98 rather than
opening the door to judicial creativity and arbitrariness.99 This transparency
of rules leads to impartial decisionmaking.100 Through mechanical
enforcement of a robust exclusionary rule or an unfettered access rule, all are
equally protected by law, for each similarly situated person is sure to be
treated alike where cases are decided prospectively. The value, then, of these
rules is that they give those persons potentially impacted by a beach access
policy warning as to whether or not a legal directive will apply to their
courses of conduct.101 Moreover, merely avoiding the appearance of
arbitrariness may itself be of some value, in that it helps to maintain
potentially impacted persons’ confidence in the system of democratic
lawmaking more generally.102
Caution is, of course, necessary to assure that the transparency benefits
of rules of this sort are not overstated. The claim that rules are transparent is
based on several assumptions, including that rules unambiguously mean
exactly what they say, that they are complete and resolve all disputes within
their domain, and that they are, therefore, honest about the considerations
that go into dividing cases to which a given rule is applicable from cases to
which that rule is not. That a rule requires similarly situated persons to be
treated similarly is a positive trait as far as it goes; however, those
implementing such a rule will face the immediate complication of having to
97. See, e.g., Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 321,
322 (1985); see also Lovett, supra note 4, at 937 (explaining the conventional view); Pierre Schlag, Rules
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 400 (1985) (same).
98. See Radin, supra note 27, at 793–95 (describing this “deductive” or “analytic” view of a rule
as “self-applying to the set of particulars said to fall under it”); Sullivan, supra note 25, at 58 (portraying
this view in similar terms).
99. See Schlag, supra note 97, at 390–91.
100. See F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 220–33 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 2011 ed.
1960) (associating rules with an impartiality norm); Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1688; Shiffrin, supra note
79, at 1214 (“Other things being equal, rules, understood as legal directives that instruct ‘a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts,’ offer precision and
transparency.” (quoting Sullivan, supra note 25, at 58)); Sunstein, supra note 17, at 974; FREDERICK
SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 149–55 (2009).
101. See SCHAUER, supra note 100, at 194–98.
102. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989)
(“When one is dealing . . . with issues so heartfelt that they are believed by one side or the other to be
resolved by the Constitution itself, it does not greatly appeal to one’s sense of justice to say: ‘Well, that
earlier case had nine factors, this one has nine plus one.’ Much better, even at the expense of the mild
substantive distortion that any generalization introduces, to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that
one can point to in explanation of the decision.”).
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determine whether persons are, in fact, similarly situated.103 Applying a rule
in a hard case requires interpretation, which, in turn, requires resorting to
reasons that are outside the rule itself.
By not demanding an open, particularized assessment on that score in a
judicial opinion, rules conceivably may actually inhibit the transparency of
law rather than advance it.104 If judges need not give reasons for interpreting
a rule in one way rather than another, they simply can phrase the rule in a
way that decides the case before them without openly acknowledging that
their phrasing of that rule is an interpretation, elaboration, or specification of
the original rule, whose creators did not include the detail necessary to decide
its application in this new case.
It follows, therefore, that siding with a rule-based approach, such as
robust exclusion or unfettered access, may be most accurately understood as
a determination that the risk of injustice from the inherent limitations of
deciding similar situatedness case-by-case exceeds the risk of injustice from
the arbitrariness of over- and under-inclusiveness that can result from
applying these rules in a rather rigid fashion.105 Rules, proponents argue, are
transparent about this determination—transparent about this choice—at the
outset.106
B. THE TRANSPARENCY OF BEACH ACCESS STANDARDS
Standards, however, are characterized by their own less-celebrated
though still robust version of transparency. Understanding this latter version
of transparency begins with an appreciation for the rudimentary idea that
recognizing one party’s claim to a property interest regularly has the effect
of rejecting or limiting the claims of others.107 After all, according to
103. See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 994 (“A familiar understanding of equality requires the
similarly situated to be treated the same; a less familiar but also important understanding requires the
differently situated to be treated differently, also in the interest of equality.”).
104. See Curtis Bridgeman, Why Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy: Positivism,
Formalism, and the Specification of Rules in Contract Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1456–62 (2008)
(discussing the possibility that the application of rules without regard to their normative justification or
concern for the specific context in which they are being applied may lead to unjust results); Sunstein,
supra note 17, at 975.
105. See Sullivan, supra note 25, at 62; Sunstein, supra note 17, at 990.
106. Even taking the proponents’ position at face value, this is not always the case. Jeremy Bentham
famously—or infamously—advocated promoting among the public the view that the law consists of rules,
while recognizing that, covertly, the law actually consists of standards on which judges reflect in
operating the court system. GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, 195–
96 (2d ed. 2019).
107. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, A World of Distrust, 120 COLUM. L. REV. F. 153, 156–57 (2020);
Timothy M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 911, 941; Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-
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landowners increased legal power to intensify land uses unavoidably
requires them to surrender their ability to halt activities by others that
interfere with those uses.108 Given that there are almost always property
claims on both sides when considering the meaning of ownership, the
unavoidable task for lawmakers is to decide which actions to safeguard and
which actions to restrain.109 There is, in the words of Eric Freyfogle, “no
morally neutral place . . . to hide” when it comes to allocating property
interests.110
A reasonable access approach to the beachfront makes visible and
affirms, rather than obscures and denies, judges’ responsibility to reach via
normative reasoning the type of allocative decision required to resolve
parties’ competing claims to the dry sand, both because judges have to think
about reasons and because they have to explain that reasoning in written
opinions that require articulation of otherwise inchoate and intuitive
judgments.111 It accomplishes this end by applying pressure in two
Enforcement Takings, 59 B.C. L. REV. 145, 165–66 (2018); see also Morris R. Cohen, Property and
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8, 13 (1927) (“[D]ominion over things is . . . imperium over our fellow
human beings.”). Other rights, such as free speech, often are not “rivalrous” in this sense. See Laura S.
Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1039 (1996).
108. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Taking Property Seriously, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
SUSTAINABILITY: THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS TO MEET ECOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 43, 50
(David Grinlinton & Prue Taylor eds., 2011) (explaining that, in such an instance, property rights do not
increase overall but rather are “simply reconfigured”); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as
Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 17 (1993) (“ ‘[P]rivate rights’ always have social consequences.”);
Joseph William Singer, Property Law as the Infrastructure of Democracy 10 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 11-16), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1832829 (citing
the “principle of noncontradiction” that “all owners must be limited in what they can do on their land so
that all owners can have quiet enjoyment of their land”); Joseph William Singer, Something Important in
Humanity, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 111 (2002) (“[N]o meaningful fairness argument can be
wholly nonconsequentialist.”). For this reason, framing adjustments in property laws as “strengthening”
or “weakening” individual property claims can be misleading and counter-productive. See, e.g., Jonathan
Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449, 492–501 (2010).
109. See C.B. Macpherson, Liberal-Democracy and Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND
CRITICAL POSITIONS 199, 201 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978) (juxtaposing the “individual right to exclude”
with the “individual right to equal access”); Sanne H. Knudsen, Remedying the Misuse of Nature, 2012
UTAH L. REV. 141, 151 (suggesting that addressing the “uncomfortable and unclear question” of “where
to draw the line between [land] use and misuse” is “inevitable given that people and nature are
intertwined”); Joseph William Singer, After the Flood: Equality & Humanity in Property Regimes, 52
LOY. L. REV. 243, 258 (2006) (“[R]egulations are generally designed to limit one person’s freedom to
protect another’s freedom. In such cases, the question is not whether government should intervene but on
whose behalf it should do so.”).
110. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 84 (2010); see also
Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 161, 201
(1996) (arguing that “[n]o model of property avoids value choice[s]”).
111. See, e.g., Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the
Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821, 825–26 (1962); see also ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD 265 (2003) (“Good reasoning is often stimulated when
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directions. From one direction, this approach eliminates the facade of judges
being able to hide behind a robust exclusion or unfettered access rule as if
that rule’s application is an objective, neutral act that need not be justified in
service of the common good.112 From the other direction, it gives comfort to
judges who might feel hamstrung by a rigid rule behind which they would
prefer not to hide.113
Relatedly, a reasonable access approach prompts judges—“create[s] a
habit of mind”114—to consider the perspective of anyone who might be
affected by the allocation of the exclusionary and access interests at stake.115
Such an approach encourages—indeed, forces—courts to analyze cases
openly, in a manner that elicits direct discussion.116 Consider, for instance, a
scenario—hypothetical here, though disturbingly reminiscent of behavior in
many coastal communities in the not-so-distant past—in which the
aforementioned Kassin’s efforts were part of a covert pattern by private
titleholders in a homogenous coastal community to intimidate a subset of
would-be beachgoers from more diverse inland communities on the basis of
race.117 Here, Kassin’s exclusionary tactic is not aimed so much at a
lawmakers take the time to explain why they did what they did. . . .”).
112. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 18 (1992); see also Radin, supra note 27, at 813. In Frank Michelman’s
words, such an approach calls on judges to “confront the parties in the flesh.” Frank I. Michelman,
Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 35 (1986). A rigid, rule-based approach, on
the other hand, allows the “deferment” of concerns. See Schlag, supra note 97, at 411.
113. See, e.g., David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 414
(2015).
114. See Sullivan, supra note 25, at 69.
115. Cf. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 60–70 (1990) (characterizing productive deliberation as that consisting of the
consideration of multiple perspectives).
116. Shiffrin, supra note 79, at 1226–27 (“The process by which deliberation affects behavior and
articulates cognition may be more akin to a slow, sometimes clogged, drip than to a quick, direct
injection.”).
117. Past public and private discrimination in this context—through supposedly color-blind and
race-neutral residency restrictions, beach fee policies, parking limitations, prohibitions on wearing
swimwear on local streets or eating on the beach, the creation of members-only coastal associations, and
the like—has been masterfully documented by Marc Poirier and Andrew Kahrl, among others. See
ANDREW W. KAHRL, FREE THE BEACHES: THE STORY OF NED COLL AND THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA’S
MOST EXCLUSIVE SHORELINE 12–13 (2018); ANDREW W. KAHRL, THE LAND WAS OURS: HOW BLACK
BEACHES BECAME WHITE WEALTH IN THE COASTAL SOUTH 4–6 (2012); Marc R. Poirier, Environmental
Justice and the Beach Access Movements of the 1970s in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property
and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719 (1996); see also Note, Public Access to Beaches: Common Law
Doctrines and Constitutional Challenges, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 369, 393 n.171 (1973) (“One would have
to live in a vacuum not to suspect that many beach restrictions are based in part on racial motivation,
intermingled with the idea of building a wall between city and suburb.”); REBECCA DE SCHWEINITZ, IF
WE COULD CHANGE THE WORLD: YOUNG PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S LONG STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY 181 (2009) (“Recreational facilities were one of the most common ways that young people
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“private” versus “public” conflict akin to that at issue in the actual matter of
Bubis v. Kassin as it is on an identity-defining version of “resident” versus
“nonresident” conflict.118 In this hypothetical context, then, a decision on
whether Kassin must provide additional public access to and use of the dry
sand beach to which she holds private title is not considering the value of
promoting sociability generally, but on challenging an insidious, divisive,
and prejudiced form of sociability.119 While a rule often presumptively
equates the powers that rule confers with reason and can thus blind us to
potentially unjust uses of those powers, a standard openly triggers a demand
for reason-giving on the uses of powers by the likes of this hypothetical
Kassin along a continuum from legitimate to oppressive.120
By providing lucidity on all that is at stake, the reasonable access
approach calls for upfront conversation and communication on what makes
access valuable and how that value ought to be considered in the face of any
downsides that might come with sacrificing the titleholder’s ability to
exclude.121 Rather than leaving judges with the option of carving out
exceptions to rules or distinguishing their applications—an option that some
judges may not have the confidence to exercise, even if they see the latent
contradictory principles that underlie most all property conflicts—the
reasonable access approach compels open contemplation every time with
regards to any shifting understandings of what expectations are legitimate,
what distribution of opportunities is appropriate, which exercises of which
powers are justifiable, and what obligations are fair to assume that we, as
citizens, owe to each other.122 Rather than dissociating the task at hand from
these inquiries or masking them behind a cloud, a standards-based regime
collectively experienced Jim Crow.”).
118. See Poirier, supra note 117, at 743–44 (“[T]he shore municipalities often limited beach use to
a town’s residents, or put beach fees or other barriers in the way of nonresidents’ use of town beaches.”).
119. See Poirier, supra note 21, at 105–06, 118 (suggesting that a general requirement of reasonable
access can counter discriminatory efforts without having to confront the challenges in applying extant
constitutional and statutory antidiscrimination protections).
120. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 535 (1988) (book
review).
121. See Poirier, supra note 21, at 97–99 (“Different uses are congestible in different ways; one
owner’s highly desired oil transshipping facility may have down sides acceptable to her, but affect nearby
owners’ and other stakeholders’ homes and fishing in ways that make them unhappy.”).
122. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 49–50 (1986) (“[T]he only thing remotely like a solution [to a moral
dilemma] is, in fact, to describe and see the conflict clearly and to acknowledge that there is no way
out.”); Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1773 (contending that a standard “denies the judge the right to apply
rules without looking over his shoulder at the results”); Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An
Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 566 (1977) (book review) (contending that formal rules
promote “substantive inequality by creating a consciousness that radically separates law from politics,
means from ends, processes from outcomes”).

1_MULVANEY_JCI_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

8/17/21 9:51 PM

WALLING OUT

29

consistently brings these inquiries to the fore.123
Enhanced transparency touches not only judges but individual actors in
social and market settings. A robust exclusionary rule or an unfettered access
rule can create, in the words of Morton Horwitz, a “consciousness that
radically separates law from politics.”124 Such messaging suggests that
beachgoers and titleholders may well be less prone to put themselves in a
position where, ultimately, they might have to ask a judge, respectively, to
carve out an exception or to recognize a distinction to what they have been
led to believe is a firm robust exclusionary rule or unfettered access rule than
they would be to ask a judge to apply a reasonable access standard.125 The
substance of the law in a rule-like regime therefore may have a propensity to
be less “full” and, in turn, less contemporarily sharp than that in a standardbased regime.126 A standard-based regime recognizes and confronts the
impermanency of the powers conferred by law, prompting lawsuits focused
on justifying the exercise of power on select occasion, but, far more
commonly, encouraging ongoing mutual engagement and honest dialogue
on competing perspectives outside the courtroom.127 In effect, the
123. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 122, at 50. Of course, rules can at times make it easier for judges
to stand by positions that are unpopular with the majority when they should do so. Scalia, supra note 102,
at 1180; Sunstein, supra note 17, at 975.
124. See Horwitz, supra note 122, at 566.
125. Carol Rose implicitly makes this point in the course of discussing the unequal distribution of
knowledge and access to information. See Rose, supra note 25, at 600. My raising it here is not to deny
the reality that litigation is extremely costly and, therefore—even with robust legal aid services, nonprofit ventures, public advocates’ offices, and the like—can lead to extensive inequalities if it is relied
upon too heavily as either a shield or a sword. See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 977. A related point is that
one’s conception of a rule or standard inevitably will be a product of the extent to which that rule or
standard is enforced. See KELMAN, supra note 26, at 49–50. Louis Kaplow addresses the question of cost
from a different angle. Kaplow, supra note 94, at 557. Kaplow suggests that, generally, rules are more
expensive to create than standards but standards are costlier for individuals to interpret when deciding
how to conduct themselves and for adjudicators to apply to prior conduct. Id. at 562–63. In Kaplow’s
view, it follows that rules are economically efficient where the rules will be implicated frequently and in
substantially similar settings. Id. at 563. But see Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring
of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 8 (1993) (suggesting that transparent standards create
an inexpensive way of “gaining a rough idea of the law’s content”).
126. See Michelman, supra note 112, at 34–36 (discussing how balancing tests engage judges in
transparent forms of public reason and, in turn, how judicial engagement prompts public engagement).
127. See Shiffrin, supra note 79, at 1217 (“For the people to whom they apply . . . , open-ended
standards may encourage greater levels of moral deliberation than would clear guidelines.”); id. at 122225 (“I contend that the uncertainty of application is, in the appropriate context, among [a standard’s]
virtues because it requires that the citizen who aims to be compliant, whether from motives of justice or
motives of prudence, grapple with the relevant moral concepts directly.”); see also KELMAN, supra note
26, at 62 (“A reliance on standards is premised on the hope of moral dialogue and ultimate
consensus. . . . Rules do not depend on ongoing dialogue to gain dimension or content.”). Much like the
Scottish experience is instructive with respect to issues of determinacy, see supra note 93, that experience
is instructive with respect to transparency, too. As one commentator describes it, the reality that a good
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communication stimulated by a standard-based regime both allows for the
expression of competing social visions and disciplines those expressions.128
The combination of impacts—on judges and members of the public—
stemming from the transparency of a reasonable access approach can create
a constructive cycle of sorts: judges, by forthrightly reciting and analyzing
the interests on all sides of exclusion/access disputes and explaining the
justifications for their allocative choices amidst competing claims, can drive
public engagement and discussion; in turn, such public engagement and
discussion can—given the communal and contemporary nature of any
reasonableness standard129—shape the decisions made by judges in related
cases in the future.130 Requiring judges to explain why access or
exclusionary interests are entitled to protection lays to bare their value
judgments and any assumptions on which those judgments rest, thereby
subjecting them to meaningful scrutiny by other courts and the public at
large.131 It also controls choice in the following way: having to explain
something to others may deter judges from initial intuitions when, despite
their best efforts, the opinion just “will not write” in the sense that they
realize that they cannot present arguments in a way that is convincing given
the counterarguments that must be addressed. Writing the reasoning down
can, therefore, change the result by giving judges an impetus to change their
minds. In turn, then, a reasonable access approach increases the likelihood
that those who do not prevail in an access dispute will be offered a
justification that, however hard to swallow, should be accepted by reasonable
persons in their shoes under the circumstances.
deal of Scotland is subject to access encourages “landowners, access takers, and local officials . . . to enter
into a long term, evolving dialogue about how to accommodate each other’s needs—landowner’s
legitimate management interests, homeowners’ privacy and personal enjoyment needs, and the public’s
interest in responsible access taking.” Lovett, supra note 93, at 782.
128. See Singer, supra note 120, at 543.
129. See KELMAN, supra note 26, at 61 (“A typical standard (‘Don’t act unreasonably,’ ‘Enforce
fair bargains’) requires that the enforcing community . . . can come to some consensus on the meaning of
the value term, that the group can come to share a conception of reasonableness or fairness.”)
130. See Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1528–33 (1988) (explaining how
interpretations of constitutional provisions that lack precision can interact in constructive ways with
political movements and citizen engagement); Shiffrin, supra note 79, at 1126 (explaining how standards
can be understood to “partially delegate authority back to citizens”); Sunstein, supra note 17, at 958
(suggesting that contextualized decisionmaking seek to “make space for the democratic goals of
participation and responsiveness”).
131. But see David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules
and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 428 (2013) (describing rules’ propensity to drive the “transparency
of discretion . . . underground”).
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C. ON REFLECTION: TRANSPARENCY AND BEACH ACCESS
Highlighting the transparency virtues of a reasonable access regime—
promoting dialogue, demanding accountability, and insisting on
justification—is not meant to endorse the view that standards-based
approaches are superior to rule-like approaches in all circumstances,132 that
standards necessarily reveal value judgments,133 or that rule-like approaches
necessarily suppress or conceal those judgments.134 In some contexts, courts
could directly address foundational normative principles in the application
of a rule over time, such that the transparency gains from resorting to a
standard are quite minimal; in others, a standard could be so opaque in
operation that it is not prompting the type of justificatory conversation touted
here;135 and, in still others, nontransparency virtues of rules may supersede
the collective virtues of siding with standards. This highlighting exercise
does, though, support the claim that the transparency virtues of beach access
standards deserve attention. A transparent standards-based framework
cannot absolutely guarantee a more rational and intelligible doctrinal
framework. However, it seems sufficiently apt, at least generally, to establish
the conditions under which such rationality and intelligibility can emerge,
for it puts on the table the value judgments at stake for all to see.136
132. See, e.g., KELMAN, supra note 26, at 20 (“[N]o polar position has such killer force as to negate
utterly its opposite.”).
133. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1741 (explaining that the application of a standard could be done
in a way that “smuggl[es] in [a] substantive policy the lawmaker had rejected”).
134 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 25, at 607 (suggesting that “there is a much softer, more
sociable . . . side to crystal rules and to the commerce that accompanied their development,” which “[a]t
least some Enlightenment thinkers thought . . . would enlarge sociability and . . . be a constitutive force
in ever larger communities of ‘interest’ ”). Transparent choices could, of course, be made by a legislature
and incorporated into a clearly written statute that operates in a rule-like fashion. For instance, in most
states, the state legislature has confirmed that the area between the mean low-tide line and the mean hightide line is impressed with public rights. See Kehoe, supra note 3. Even there, though, the rule is not
unequivocal; for instance, public access to the foreshore may be limited in select locales under certain
conditions in the interests of national security. See, e.g., SUSAN M. KENNEDY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
BEACH ACCESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NEW JERSEY 20 (Tony MacDonald ed., 2017),
https://www.monmouth.edu/uci/documents/2018/10/beach-access-report.pdf [perma.cc/UE33-SWJB].
135. Indeed, the Supreme Court has interpreted the federal Constitution’s Due Process Clause to
void enforcement of statutes that are unacceptably vague. See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926).
136. See Han, supra note 113, at 362. Beach access, of course, loses its salience where the beach is
no longer. Conservative estimates suggest that sea levels in the United States will rise two feet, on
average, by the year 2100; other estimates forecast a rise of anywhere from six to eleven feet. See NAT’L
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SEA LEVEL RISE SCENARIOS FOR THE
UNITED STATES 3 (Jan. 2017), https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publications/techrpt83_Global_and_Re
gional_SLR_Scenarios_for_the_US_final.pdf [perma.cc/4QQQ-SNTR]; Robert M. DeConto & David
Pollard, Contribution of Antarctica to Past and Future Sea-Level Rise, NATURE, March 2016, at 591–
597. On undeveloped shores, dune and beach ecosystems naturally migrate landward as sea levels rise
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CONCLUSION
In the conventional terms of the long-running debate surrounding the
design of legal directives, “rules” bring a determinacy and transparency to
the law that “standards” sacrifice in the interest of accommodating the
complexities of individual cases. On their face, the allocations of rights and
privileges with respect to nearly all dry sand beaches in the United States fall
decidedly into the rules camp, for they categorically determine whom to wall
in and whom to wall out. In Hohfeldian terms,137 the private titleholder to
and other impacts of climate change rear their heads. However, the ever-expanding presence of hardened
structures near the water’s edge along so much of the U.S. coastline drastically interferes with this
migration pattern. ORRIN H. PILKEY & J. ANDREW G. COOPER, THE LAST BEACH 14–16, 49 (2014). In
some instances, this migration is halted by pre-existing and, in hindsight, ill-advised residential and
commercial development that, for political and other reasons, is now difficult to phase out; in others,
though, the migration is halted by “coastal protection” measures erected for this very purpose. Id. at 44–
77. For a contemporary example of the latter, the federal government recently partnered with the State of
Texas to propose construction of a one hundred-mile long, gated barrier that would lie both in and
alongside the Gulf of Mexico in an effort to provide temporary protection for existing coastal structures
and businesses against the increasing dangers of rising seas and storm surges. See Nick Powell, Army
Corps Gives Nod to $31B ‘Ike Dike’ Plan for Texas Coast, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Army-Corps-gives-nod-to-31BIke-Dike-plan-13340756.php#article-comments [https://perma.cc/SA7N-843M].
All hardened structures—from homes and businesses to gated barriers—have a propensity to
promote widespread erosion on their seaward side and thereby threaten the existence of dry sand beaches.
See, e.g., James R. Drabick, Note, “Private” Public Nuisance and Climate Change: Working Within, and
Around, the Special Injury Rule, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 503, 535 (2005). These structures operate
to transfer wave and water energy to the beach, rather than allowing it to dissipate and fluctuate naturally.
See generally PITFALLS OF SHORELINE STABILIZATION: SELECTED CASE STUDIES (J. Andrew G. Cooper
& Orrin H. Pilkey eds., 2012). The concentrated energy rebounds off the face of the structures and whisks
sand into the sea, reducing the size of the beach. See id. at 50. At the same time, these structures can
prevent natural sand replacement from rivers and coastal bluffs. Id. at 51. In total, then, the rebalancing
process of the beach across the seasons is thus inhibited. Id. at 65, 67. With increased erosion and reduced
sand supply, the beach in front of a hardened structure will retreat to the base of that structure until no
dry sand beach remains, cutting off the public’s ability to use that beach and choking transit to any
neighboring beaches that survive. See Orrin H. Pilkey & Howard L. Wright III, Seawalls Versus Beaches,
J. COASTAL RES. (SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 4) 41, 63 (1988) (“Comparison of totally stabilized and totally
unstabilized reaches of individual barriers indicates that dry beach width is consistently narrower in front
of hard stabilization.”).
Decisionmakers, both public and private, face hard choices in the face of competing claims by
coastal landowners and the rights of the public along a coastline that is under marked threat from sealevel rise and other climate-induced phenomena. When compared to the potentially discussion-halting
consequences of what on their face are rule-like beach access regimes, it seems possible that a transparent
approach to resolving competing claims at the water’s edge—one that demands frank discussion on the
justifications for affording access and promoting exclusivity—might provide greater assurance that the
issue of beaches will, at minimum, be among other matters of consideration in the development of policies
to adapt to and mitigate the effects of sea-level rise and other phenomena associated with a changing
climate.
137. In a pair of highly influential articles published over a century ago, Wesley Hohfeld developed
an analytical framework for understanding interests in property as relational pairs. See Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710
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the dry sand beach in most jurisdictions—including, as illustrated herein,
Texas—holds a robust right to exclude others without cause and the public
correlatively holds no privileges of access and use; meanwhile, in select
states, such as Oregon, the public holds an unfettered privilege to access and
use beaches and the private titleholder holds no right to exclude. An outlier
in following a standards-based approach, New Jersey allocates to the public
reasonable access and use privileges and, in turn, accords private titleholders
a right to exclude those who enter unreasonably.138
This Article has contended that the implementation of these beach
access policies illustrates the familiar limitations of the conventional rulesversus-standards account in two elucidating ways. First, in terms of
determinacy, deciding whether a given beach access rule applies has required
contextualized assessment; likewise, standards pertaining to beach access
have taken shape through applications in archetypical cases. That the
question of reasonable access is asked directly in New Jersey, while, in the
likes of Texas and Oregon, it takes the form of indirectly asking whether it
would be reasonable to craft an exception, fashion a qualification, or
recognize a distinction with regards to the extant rule, does only marginal
work in distinguishing these jurisdictional approaches. Second, as to
transparency, while rules admittedly require decisionmakers to treat like
cases alike and thereby minimize some forms of arbitrariness, standards offer
their own robust version of transparency, which is grounded in promoting
dialogue, demanding accountability, and insisting on justification.
That this Article celebrates the determinacy and transparency features
of standards should not be understood as endorsing the view that, in all
circumstances, standards necessarily are superior to rules, standards
necessarily reveal value judgments, or rules necessarily suppress or conceal
those judgments.139 Rules undoubtedly have their place. At the same time,
though, they cannot be instinctively understood as a panacea for resolving
(1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913). Under this framework, if one individual holds a specific
entitlement (a right, privilege, power, or immunity), the other person involved in that relationship holds
the opposite of that entitlement (correlatively, a duty, no-right, liability, or disability).
138. Where “hardly any corner of property law is immune from the inexorable tendency of
lawmakers to demand that people act reasonably,” the fact that New Jersey is one of just two states to
require reasonable access to the beach indicates that beach access law has not reflected a more general
trend in property law. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & BRADLEY C. KARKKAINEN, PROPERTY LAW: POWER,
GOVERNANCE, AND THE COMMON GOOD 804 (2012).
139. Indeed, according to Mark Kelman, “there will remain in any legal dispute a logically or
empirically unanswerable formal problem, that granting substantially greater discretion or limiting
discretion through significantly greater rule boundedness in the formation of the prevailing legal
command is always perfectly plausible.” KELMAN, supra note 26, at 16.
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all conflicts or left to operate in a manner that ignores the possibility that, in
their implementation, unfairness can result and dominating hierarchies can
perpetuate. A reasonable access standard in the beachfront context charts a
path that is sensitive, over time, to the value of determinacy but is
simultaneously transparent in its engagement with contemporary human
needs. In a given jurisdictional context, it may or may not be a path worth
emulating; to reject a reasonable access standard out of hand, though, is to
ignore the sacrifices that decision requires.

